



# **THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY**

## **VOLUME I**

By:

Michael J. Trebilcock  
Ralph Winter  
Paul Collins  
Edward Iacobucci  
University of Toronto



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# THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY

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# **CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

## **CHAPTER 1**

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# **BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS**

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**MULTI-FIRM CONDUCT:  
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS**

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